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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
CPLR 7503: Third-party action stayed pending arbitration.
CPLR 1007 permits a prime defendant to implead a third
person who may be liable to him if the prime plaintiff is
successful in his suit. This provision is intended to determine
all issues and liabilities at once and thereby avoid a multiplicity of
actions. 13 7 If the defendant was compelled to prosecute a separate
action subsequently, the third person would not be bound by any
of the determinations in the first suit. Although the critical issues
might be identical, they would have to be re-tried since the fact
that the third person did not have the opportunity to litigate
them would preclude the use of collateral estoppel. 138  Thus, use
of third-party practice precludes the possibility of inconsistent
decisions. 11
39
Though it no doubt had these considerations in mind, the
supreme court in Sherwood Village Cooperative A, Inc. v. Had-Ten
Estates Corp.,140 stayed the prosecution of a general contractor's
third-party claim against its subcontractor. The general contractor
was being sued in contract for alleged faulty masonry work.
The defendant in turn impleaded his masonry subcontractor basing
the third-party complaint on breach of the subcontract. This
contract provided for arbitration of all disputes arising thereunder.
After reviewing conflicting authority,14' the court held that the
agreement to arbitrate could not be avoided by the initiation of
a third-party action. Therefore, the action was stayed with
directions to submit the claim to arbitration pursuant to CPLR
7503.
Since a court in a subsequent action would not be bound
by a prior determination in the prime suit, it would follow that
an arbitrator could also reach an opposite conclusion as to the
issue of defective workmanship. Thus, the defendant may find
himself liable to the plaintiff but not entitled to recovery from the
subcontractor.
13711 N.Y. JUD. CouNciL RaP. 58 (1945).
'13 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
139 2 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLEan, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTIcE, ff 1007.01
(1966).
14053 Misc. 2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct Queens County 1967).
'41 Greene Steel & Wire Co. v. F. W. Hartmann & Co., 235 N.Y.S.2d
238 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962), aff'd inem., 20 App. Div. 2d 683, 247
N.Y.S.2d 1008 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 14 N.Y.2d 688, 198 N.E.2d
914, 249 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1964) (stay of third party action granted);
Knolls Cooperative Section No. 1, Inc. v. Hennessey, 3 Misc. 2d 220, 150
N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1956) (stay of third party action
granted); Puritan Fabrics, Inc. v. Charm Togs, Inc., 70 N.Y.S.2d 453
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947) (stay of third party action denied).
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This is precisely the situation CPLR 1007 was meant to
prevent. However, the court in this case appears to have had
no alternative since the defendant had contracted away his right
to judicial resolution of disputes. This decision stands as a
warning against careless drafting of arbitration agreements. This
unfortunate situation could have been avoided by a clause exempt-
ing from arbitration disputes originating in suits against the
general contractor. Under such a clause, the parties could still
arbitrate the many disputes that would be solely inter se. This
suggested provision must be clear and express since, as this case
indicates, the courts will not find an implied one.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
DRL § 236: Impact on support proceedings in Family Court.
While the Family Court is powerless to entertain matrimonial
actions, it does have the power under Section 412 of the Family
Court Act to order support of the wife. The award may be on
a minimum "public charge" basis, i.e., based on preventing the
wife from becoming a public charge, or, in the court's discretion,
it may be based on the husband's ability to pay.'42 Although the
Family Court has independent discretion, it has usually followed
certain criteria used by the supreme court in matrimonial actions.1
43
Prior to section 236, the rule in the supreme court had been
that where the wife lost her separation action due to her
voluntarily living apart, she was not entitled to support. 44 Follow-
ing the supreme court's direction, the Family Court denied support
on a "means" basis where the wife was voluntarily living apart. 45
Since the adoption of Section 236 of the Domestic Relations
Law,'146 the supreme court has been more liberal in awarding
142Section 412 of the Family Court Act provides that: "[a] husband is
chargeable with the support of his wife and, if possessed of sufficient
means . . . , may be required to pay for her support a fair and reasonable
sum, as the court may determine, having due regard to the circumstances
of the respective parties" (emphasis added).
143Zunder v. Zunder, 187 Misc. 557, 62 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
Bronx County 1946); Kenneson v. Kenneson, 178 Misc. 832, 36 N.Y.S.2d
676 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Bronx County 1942).
'44 Batchelor v. Batchelor, 295 N.Y. 544, 68 N.E.2d 681 (1946); Solomon
v. Solomon, 290 N.Y. 337, 49 N.E.2d 470 (1943); Roosevelt v. Roosevelt,
13 App. Div. 2d 334, 216 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1st Dep't 1961).
145Zunder v. Zunder, 187 Misc. 557, 62 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
Bronx County 1946).
146 Section 236 provides that "... the court may direct the husband
to provide suitably for the support of the wife as, in the court's discretion,
justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of
the respective parties. . . . Such direction may be made . . . notwith-
standing that the court refuses to grant the relief requested by the wife . .
(emphasis added).
[ VOL. 4:2
